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Abstract 
A scientific reasoning system makes decisions 
using objective evidence in the form of inde­
pendent experimental trials, propositional ax­
ioms, and constraints on the probabilities of 
events. As a first step towards this goal, we 
propose a system that derives probability in­
tervals from objective evidence in those forms. 
Our reasoning system can manage uncertainty 
about data and rules in a rule based expert 
system. We expect that our system will be 
particularly applicable to diagnosis and anal­
ysis in domains with a wealth of experimental 
evidence such as medicine. We discuss limi­
tations of this solution and propose future di­
rections for this research. This work can be 
considered a generalization of Nilsson's "prob­
abilistic logic" [Nil86] to intervals and experi­
mental observations. 
*We gratefully acknowledge the work of Carolyn 
Sher in editing this work and the assistance of Moises 
Sudit regarding nonlinear programming. 
1 Introduction 
Expert systems were originally defined as a 
method of encoding the knowledge and rea­
soning of a human expert into a computer pro­
gram. However, for many diagnostic and an­
alytical reasoning problems we would prefer 
that the computer program base its reasoning 
on objective facts rather than human exper­
tise, especially when no experts are available 
or the reasoning of the available experts is sus­
pect. Thus, we propose a system for reasoning 
from objective criteria.. 
When objective data is collected by scien­
tists and engineers it is often in the form of in­
dependently distributed trials or experiments. 
An example of experimental data is: in a sam­
ple of 100 toys 10 arrived damaged. Some of 
these experiments verify facts, as in our ex­
ample, others may verify rules, i.e. of 10 red 
toys 1 arrived damaged, establishing a rela­
tionship between redness and damage. Sev­
eral rules can conflict, i.e. of 10 toy trucks 9 
arrived damaged which raises the question of 
the red toy truck. This paper describes a com­
putationally feasible algorithm for making de­
cisions from this type of evidence. We present 
a preliminary methodology for evidence com­
bination, where the source of the evidence is 
experimental in nature. 
Our scheme can also account for other meth­
ods of expressing objective information such as 
axiomatic statements, ie. trucks have wheels, 
and restrictions on the probabilities of events, 
ie. the probability of heads on a fair coin is 0.5, 
the probability of heads when Joe is flipping 
the coin is somewhere between 0.6 and 0.8. 
Initially we will focus on our management of 
experimental evidence since this is the unique 
feature of our approach. 
2 Previous Work 
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to Good's Bayesian interval approach [Goo50, 
Goo83] when only interval probabilities are 
supplied. Our work also is meant to handle the 
cases the same class of applications as Judea 
Pearl's probability networks [Pea86a, Pea85] 
and other Bayesian network paradigms (Lev86, 
Sha85, Pea86b, ED84, Mar85, CR87, CC87, 
She89]. However, we do not have to supply 
or calculate precise probabilities and can take 
into account the fact that certain calculations 
are much better informed than others. 
Our work generalizes Nilsson's "probabilis­
tic logic" [Nil86] where he introduces the JDVs 
(with a different name). His work analyzes the 
case where all the information are point prob­
abilities for events; our work reduces to his 
when our information is in this form. 
Our work was inspired largely by Henry Ky­
burg and Ron Loui's work [Kyb87, Lou84] 
at the University of Rochester on the logi- 3 
cal foundations of statistical inference. Their 
Definitions 
The input to our system consists of a set of 
propositions, and a set of experiments that 
test logical combinations of these propositions. 
For example, consider playing poker against 
Harry. What can we deduce from Harry's 
body language about his hand? Consider 
these two propositions: 
work uses experimental results to derive sets 
of confidence intervals and then develops an 
algebra of these sets of confidence intervals. 
Other important influences on this work is 
the Dempster-Shafer system [WH82, WS88] 
for managing uncertainty and the analyses 
thereof [Gro85, HL85, Kyb87]. Dempster­
Shafer reasoning expresses belief as mass func­
tions over sets of possible beliefs and develops 
a calculus of such mass functions for evidence 
combination. While such mass functions may 
be a good way of summarizing human exper­
tise, we felt that they were not suitable for 
expressing the uncertainty inherent in objec­
tive evidence. Hau and Kashyap [HK87] sug­
gested a method of applying Dempster-Shafer 
and fuzzy reasoning to rule based expert sys­
tems which we consider one of the best ap­
proaches to this problem if the rules and facts 
in the system are derived from a subjective or 
qualitative source. 
This work owes a great deal to the Bayesian 
interval approach to uncertainty; it reduces 
1. A: Harry lit his pipe. 
2. B: Harry has 2 pair. 
Some experiments about the relationship be­
tween these two events are: (1) In the first 30 
hands Harry lit his pipe in 9 of them. (2) In 
the next 40 hands Harry had two pair in 5 of 
them. (3) In the following hands you noticed 
that of the 6 times he lit his pipe 5 of those 
times he had two pair. 
The joint distribution of events in our do­
main contain all the information about the 
domain that is useful for deduction. The 
joint distribution is the probability distribu­
tion over the elements of the truth table, i.e. 
in our poker example: 
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• a: A and B 
• b: A and not B 
• c: not A and B 
• d: not A and not B 
If we knew the probability of a, b, c, and d, we 
could determine the probability of any logi­
cal combination of events and all the condi­
tional probabilities too. Hence, to engage in 
deduction from experimental evidence, we will 
study the issue of estimating a joint distribu­
tion from experimental evidence. 
4 Maximum 
Estimation 
Likelihood 
In this work we propose estimating the proba­
bility of a proposition as being one of the prob­
abilities derived from a joint distribution that 
maximizes the probability of the experimental 
results. 
In estimation theory if we are estimating the 
value of e, the function that maps values of e 
into probabilities of the observed data is called 
the likelihood function. The value of e that 
maximizes the likelihood function is called the 
maximum likelihood estimate. The maximum 
likelihood joint distribution is the joint distri­
bution that maximizes the probability of the 
experimental results. 
We assume that each experiment is identi­
cally independently distributed (iid) and that 
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implies that the probability of a set of experi­
ments is the product of the probabilities from 
each experiment. Hence, the likelihood func­
tion for statements (1) and (2) of our poker 
example is: 
Conditional experiments, where the result 
is only reported when a condition applies ie: 
statement (3), have a conditional probability. 
The probability of a conditional experiment is 
the ratio of the probability of the conjunction 
of the condition and the event and the prob­
ability of the condition. Thus the probability 
of statement (3) is 
The probability of (1), (2) and (3) is 
Since we had an experiment on A where A 
occurred 9 times, we could perform up to 9 
conditional experiments on A and still express 
the likelihood function as a polynomial (rather 
than a rational function). This paper's anal­
ysis is restricted to sets of experiments whose 
likelihood function is a polynomial; this means 
that given N experiments using condition X, 
an experiment was done where condition X oc­
curred at least N times. 
Observation Space the sampling was unbiased. The probability of 5 
observing a logical combination of the primi­
tives (such as "A or B") is a sum of proba­
bilities in the joint distribution; in our poker 
example the probability of A is a + b and B is 
Each joint distribution is an assignment of 
probabilities to a finite set of mutually exclu­
sive events; hence a joint distribution can be 
considered a vector (JDV) and the locus of 
joint distributions is a set of points in a vec­
tor space. In our poker example there are four 
a + c. Thus the probability of an experiment 
on A where A was observed 3 out of 5 times 
is then (a+ b)3(c + d)2• The iid assumption 
mutually exclusive events, a, b, c and d; assign­
ments of probabilities to these events corre­
spond to four dimensional vectors. The prob­
ability of an observation is a linear function of 
the JDV, in our poker example A has a prob­
ability of a + b. These linear functions define 
a dual space of observation vectors (OV) with 
the same dimensionality, whose coefficients are 
1 if the corresponding element of the joint dis­
tribution is compatible with the observation 
and 0 otherwise. In our poker example A 
is represented by the vector (1, 1, 0, 0) and B 
is (1, 0, 1, 0) and A but not B is the vector 
(0, 1, 0, 0). The probability of an observation 
under a joint distribution is the dot product 
of the OV with the JDV. 
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Proposition Vector 
A (1,1,0,0) 
tors: not A (0, 0, 1, 1) these vectors 
B (1, 0, 1, 0) 
not B (0, 1, 0, 1) 
a three dimensional s ace span p . The vector 
(1, -1, -1, 1) is perpendicular to all four of 
these vectors. The space spanned by this vec­
tor is the null space of any set of observations 
where A, not A, B and not B were observed. 
Any two JDV's that differ by an element of 
the null space (such as (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25) 
and (0.5, 0, 0, 0.5)) yields the same likelihood 
for any set of observations; the observations 
made in statements (1) and (2) yield a likeli­
hood of 0.570• 
Concavity and Unique­
ness of the Maxima 
A set of observations, resulting from experi- 6 ments, corresponds to a set ofOV's that span a 
vector space called the observation space. This 
space will often be lower dimensional than the 
space spanned by JDV's. The space spanned Two different joint distributions maximize the 
likelihood of a set of experiments only if their 
JDV's differ by an element of the null space for 
that set of experiments. Hence if we can find 
a single maximum likelihood joint distribution 
we know what all of them look like. 
by the JDV's is the cross product of the obser­
vation space and the space spanned by vectors 
perpendicular to the observation space. We 
call the space spanned by vectors perpendicu­
lar to the observation space the null space. 
Note that if the difference of two JDV's is 
an element of the null space, for a set of exper­
iments, then the probability of each observa­
tion made in the experiments is the same for 
both JDV's. Since the probability of all the 
observations is the product of the probabili­
ties of each observation, the probability of the 
results from the set of experiments is the same 
for both JDV's. 
Hence, the results from those experiments 
can not tell us which of the corresponding 
joint distributions is a better model. For 
example, consider the evidence from state­
ments (1) and (2) of the poker example; the 
observations correspond to these four vee-
First, we show that the likelihood function, 
L, is concave. Assume that it and h are two 
JDV's; let f('Y) = logL(il+'Y(h-it)); L(:r) = 
ni Bi(z) where Sj are SUIDS of elements of the 
joint distribution. Each si is the dot product 
of an observation vector and a JDV; hence L = 
ni Oi. u1 + 'Y(h - hn. 
f('Y) = L log(oi • (it+ 'Y(h- it))) 
i 
Since the second derivative of f is the arith­
metic inverse of a sum of squares, it is never 
positive; hence f is concave. Since j1 and h 
are arbitrary JDV's L must be concave. 
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Now assume that it and h are maximizers 
of L. Since the log likelihood function is con­
cave, all it+ l(h- it) with 0 < 1 < 1 also 
maximize the joint likelihood function. Hence, 
the second derivative of  is 0 for 0 < 1 < 1 
because /(I) = log L(it + l(h- it)) is a con­
stant function. 
Clearly Vioi • (12 - jt) = 0; hence h - it is 
in the null space of our observations since it is 
perpendicular to all of our observation vectors. 
If it is a maximum likelihood JDV then h is a 
maximum likelihood JDV if and only if it- h 
is in the null space. 
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with, ie. proposition A in our poker exam­
ple, its probability is the same in all likelihood 
maximizing distributions. If no experiments 
have been done on a proposition, such as not 
A and not B in the poker example, upper and 
lower bounds for its probability in likelihood 
maximizing joint distributions can be deter­
mined by the method of feasible directions. 
We believe that the average computational 
cost of our system is proportional to the num­
ber of propositions whose probabilities are 
bounded and on which experiments have been 
performed; hence entering and retrieving in­
formation is linear in the amount of informa-
tion entered. 
Propositional Axioms An important feature of our system is - 8 
introducing a new observable 0 with experi­
ments in which 0 was true p of the time causes Statements of propositional logic, like A-B 
can be added to this system. They just fix 
the probability of certain elements of the joint 
distribution at 0. If we added B-A to our 
poker example then the probability of c would 
be known to be 0 and the likelihood function 
would be: a10b(a + b)3d2t(b + d)35. If experi­
mental evidence directly contradicts an axiom, 
either the evidence or the axiom must be dis-
our system to assign a probability of p to 0; 
this is in accordance with intuition. This fea­
ture derives from the fact that the {3(n, m) dis­
tribution is maximized at ::.ti . 
7 Computational 
Methods 
To discover a vector of positive numbers whose 
components sum to 1 which maximizes the 
likelihood function is a problem in nonlinear 
programming. Constraining the vector to be a 
probability distribution limits the search space 
to a convex bounded set (in the form of a hy­
pertetrahedron). Thus we suggest applying 
the method of feasible directions ofTopkis and 
Veinott [BS79]; this algorithm provably con­
verges to a maximum of the polynomials we 
propose here. 
carded. 
In our system, the probability of a proposi­
tion can be limited to a specified range. This is 
a linear constraint on the values of the JDV's. 
Since the space of legitimate JDV's is the in­
tersection of linear constraints the method of 
feasible directions still applies. Thus we can 
insert into our system experimental evidence, 
axiomatic knowledge, and probability inter­
vals. 
Simple Example Given a maximum likelihood joint distribu- 9 
tion, the method of feasible directions can also 
discover the bounds for any proposition. If In our poker example (0.0375, 0.2625, 0.0875, 
0.6125) is a JDV for statements (1) and a proposition has been directly experimented 
(2); we have discovered using numerical tech­
niques that the maximum likelihood JDV 
for statements (1), (2), and (3) is approx­
imately (0.174,0.066,0,0.76). Since the null 
space for (1 ),(2) and (3) is itself null this is 
the only maximum likelihood JDV. From these 
JDV's we can compute maximum and mini­
mum probabilities for these events· 
Event (1) and (2) (1),(2) 
Min :Max and (3) 
A 0.3 :0.3 0.24 
B 0.125:0.125 0.174 
A and B 0 :0.125 0.174 
B given A 0 :0.417 0.725 
B given not A 0 :0.179 0 
A given B 0 :1 1 
A given not B 0.2 :0.343 0.080 
This table demonstrates several facts about 
our poker example: 
• In the case where only observations (1) 
and (2) have been made: 
- The probabilities for the statement 
A and the statement B are appro­
priate given the evidence. 
- Any level of correlation between A 
and B is possible. 
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- If Harry isn't lighting his pipe then 
bet your fortune he doesn't have two 
pair (this is one of the difficulties 
with this approach). 
Our poker example demonstrates how our sys­
tem balances general knowledge about the fre­
quency of an event with inferential knowledge 
about an event. 
To further examine this case consider what 
happens if we observe another 200 hands in 
which Harry never has two pair (4). The 
JDV for this case is (0.0396257, 0.130458, 0, 
0.829916). We can update our table to include 
this assertion ru below: 
Event (1) and (2) (1),(2) (1)-(4) 
Min :Max and (3) 
A 0.3 :0.3 0.240 0.170 
B 0.125:0.125 0.174 0.040 
A and B 0 :0.125 0.174 0.040 
B given A 0 :0.417 0.725 0.233 
B given not A 0 :0.179 0 0 
A given B 0 :1 1 1 
A given not B 0.2 :0.343 0.080 0.136 
Statement ( 4) has reduced the probability of B 
considerably even in the case where A is true. 
Harry's lighting his pipe is still a very good 
clue that he may have two pairs. 
- B being false substantially con-
strains A. 10 Inadequacies and Im­
provements - Harry's lighting his pipe tells you 
very little about his hand. 
• In the case where observations (1) and (2) 
and (3) have been made: 
- Since A and B are connected by 
statement {3) their probabilities are 
brought closer together. 
- B--+A. 
- If Harry is lighting his pipe definitely 
bet on his having two pair. 
There are three major difficulties with this sys­
tem: 
1. It sometimes behaves in an unintuitive 
fashion; 
2. When convenient, it assigns the probabil­
ity of 0 to events; 
3. It is not consistent with Bayesian condi­
tionalization. 
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The initial problem will occur in any nor­
mative system since there are cases where the 
correct decision is an unintuitive one. Such 
probability paradox's abound and can be very 
subtle. Thus human judgment of intuitive sys­
tems is not useful for evaluating normative 
probability systems. A better judgment of its 
effectiveness is to evaluate the effectiveness of 
expert systems built using this system. 
The application of the maximum likelihood 
principle leads to the second problem. Assum­
ing certain events are impossible often maxi­
mizes the likelihood of a set of observations 
(if the impossible event is not observed). This 
leads to the system making overly strong state­
ments such as saying that patients without 
symptoms do not have colds under observa­
tions [3). 
The maximum likelihood principle also 
yields the last problem. If one wants to add 
into our system new information, then using 
Bayesian updating will not generate the prob­
abilities that adding the information directly 
into the system and updating its constraints 
or polynomial would. 
The last two problems can be eliminated 
by discarding the maximum likelihood princi­
ple, instead, using the likelihood function and 
Bayes' law to translate a prior probability dis­
tribution over JDV's into a posterior distribu­
tion of JDV's. Then the probability of any 
event or combination of events is computed 
by integrating over the posterior distribution 
of JDV's. This integration can be speeded by 
the fact that most probable JDV's in this dis­
tribution will lie near a maximum likelihood 
JDV's. 
We are investigating deriving the distribu­
tion over joint marginal distributions with Oc­
cam's razor: the probability of a JDV would 
be a function of its simplicity. Solomonoff has 
developed methods for evaluating the simplic­
ity of distributions and assigning probabilities 
based on this evaluation [Sol89). 
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11 Conclusion 
We have proposed a computationally efficient 
method for propositional evidence combina­
tion given logical axioms, point probabili­
ties, probability intervals and experimental ev­
idence. Our system returns probability inter­
vals that are often point probabilities; it fol­
lows a strictly Bayesian interpretation of the 
evidence subject to the maximum likelihood 
principle. In domains where the evidence is 
largely objective such as medical diagnosis or 
computer vision such a system may be supe­
rior to those based on Dempster-Shafer rea­
soning or probability networks. 
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